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Abstract
Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief for-
mation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epis-
temic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation
and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of col-
lective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those
preventable only by the collective action of an unorganized group. We
propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this
gap. Building on Hindriks’ (2019) account of collective moral responsibil-
ity, we introduce the Epistemic Duty to Join Forces. Our theory provides
an account of the responsibilities of scientists to prevent epistemic harms
during inquiry.
Keywords: epistemic harm, collective responsibility, epistemic responsi-
bility, duty to join forces, norms of inquiry
1 Collectively preventable epistemic harms
Consider the following two scenarios.
Biased. During the 1980s a number of archaeologists began to notice
gender bias in their discipline, resulting in androcentric archaeolog-
ical accounts. Empirical research was often based on sexist presup-
positions and it largely ignored microscale practices (such as those
concerning households), leading to incorrect conclusions about hu-
manity’s past. Conkey and Spector, 1984 raised this problem to the
attention of the wider archaeological community, which required an
effort of this community as a whole to be adequately resolved (see
also Conkey, 2003; Wylie, 2002). When other archaeologists learned
about these issues—for example by reading Conkey and Spector’s
1
work—did they have any moral or epistemic duties to act towards
resolving the given problem, and if so, which duties exactly?1
Abandoned-research. In the early twentieth century the medical com-
munity was investigating two hypotheses about the cause of peptic
ulcers: a) that ulcers are caused by excess stomach acid, b) that
ulcers are caused by bacteria. Due to a number of factors (such as
the difficulty in identifying the relevant bacteria, the success of acid-
ity blockers in providing a relief from symptoms etc.), the acidity
hypothesis became dominant and the bacterial one was abandoned
(Radomski et al., 2021). However, the evidence against the bacterial
hypothesis was never strong enough to definitively disprove it. More-
over, the evidence indicated that the bacterial hypothesis was still
worthy of pursuit, not least because the acidity research program
had not succeeded in providing a lasting cure for the disease (Šešelja
and Straßer, 2014b). In the 1980s Marshall and Warren made a
breakthrough discovery of Helicobacter pylori, which turned out to
be the primary cause of the disease, indicating that the bacterial hy-
pothesis was prematurely abandoned. This raises the question who
(if anyone) is to blame for prematurely abandoning the theory?
Each of these cases concerns a situation where a scientific community faces
a threat of epistemic harm. Moreover, each of these epistemic harms could be
prevented only by a group of scientists rather than by any individual. While
various scientific institutions act as organized groups that aim both at promot-
ing epistemic goals and preventing epistemic harms, the above cases illustrate
problems that typically don’t fall under the jurisdiction of an existing institu-
tion. Instead, these cases require joint action from scientists working in a given
domain, despite the fact that they are unorganized with respect to the specific
issue. Different theories of collective moral responsibility have been developed
to account for moral duties of unorganized groups in such circumstances. The
basic intuition they aim to address is that the unorganized groups of people in
cases like these have a duty to prevent the given harm.
What distinguishes the two cases above from others in the literature on col-
lective responsibility is that they concern epistemic harms.2 The depicted events
count as harms because they make people worse off with respect to epistemic
value—they impede the progress of inquiry and the acquisition of knowledge.
These cases are representative of an important and overlooked class of cases
of collectively preventable epistemic harms. Recognizing the existence of such
harms is important for our understanding of epistemic normativity, and for
giving the right account of epistemic responsibility.
1We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer for suggesting we specify our example as the
case of gender bias in archaeology.
2While both cases also concern moral harms, each crucially involves epistemic harms as
well (for a discussion on why Biased is a matter of epistemic concerns, such as empirical
adequacy, see the work of Alison Wylie, e.g. Wylie, 1992, 2002).
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We have two goals in this paper. The first is to call attention to the impor-
tance of cases like Abandoned-research and Biased, which illustrate collectively
preventable epistemic harms. The second is to offer a theory of collective epis-
temic responsibility which applies to cases of collectively preventable epistemic
harms. Our theory explains the intuitions in cases like Abandoned-research and
Biased and is designed to encourage the prevention of the kinds of harms they
exemplify. Our two-stage approach is inspired by Hindriks’ (2019) account of
collective moral responsibility. It is rooted in the idea that when a harm can
only be prevented by group action, this creates a specific duty for each individ-
ual in the unorganized group: namely, a duty to join forces in order to prevent
the harm.
The literature on epistemic responsibility has traditionally been belief-centric:
it has primarily been concerned with justified belief-formation, and actions
that lead to belief-formation (e.g., Code, 1987; Hieronymi, 2008; Kornblith,
1983a; Miller and Record, 2013; Montmarquet, 1993; Robitzsch, 2019; Zagzeb-
ski, 1996). Subsequently, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have
generally concerned collective belief-formation and actions that directly affect
it (e.g., Corlett, 2007, Rolin, 2008; Rolin, 2016).3 Our theory is distinct from
these traditional projects in two important ways. First, our project concerns
epistemic performances and other activities which do not bear directly on belief-
formation. In particular, we focus on actions at earlier stages of inquiry. Second,
our account is preventionist : it focuses on preventing epistemic harm.
Traditional accounts of collective epistemic responsibility must be supple-
mented with a preventionist account because preventing epistemic harms may
require actions other than those bearing directly on belief-formation. In other
words, a group of agents who have engaged in responsible belief-formation may
still fail to prevent other epistemic harms. Our example Biased is a case in
point. Individual archaeologists (or a group of archaeologists) who recognized
gender bias in their discipline could have engaged in a responsible belief for-
mation about the given phenomena without doing anything to prevent further
epistemic harm from happening. That is, any beliefs a responsible archaeolo-
gist (or a group of archaeologists) formed at the time could take the gender bias
into account. Moreover, they could have responsibly suspended judgment rather
than formed beliefs based on biased evidence. However, this is not enough to
prevent further epistemic harm from occurring due to additional biased evidence
being produced in their domain. An action different from a responsible belief
formation, such as encouraging the entire community to do something about
the prevalence of gender bias, was required to this end.
In what follows, we will offer some background discussion regarding collec-
tively preventable harms in ethics (§2). Next, we will introduce our account
of collective epistemic responsibility (§3) and show how it addresses the prob-
lem of collectively preventable epistemic harms. We will then offer additional
justification for the account (§4), before addressing several objections (§5).
3Millar (2020) instead concerns joint responsibility for individual beliefs and actions which
affect such beliefs.
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2 Collective moral responsibility
Often, people talk as though groups have obligations, or are responsible for
things. We hold governments and corporations accountable for their actions.
Exxon-Mobil is responsible for various oil spills. BP is obligated to clean up the
Gulf of Mexico. This suggests that there are group obligations and responsibil-
ities. A common way to classify groups that bear such obligations is as follows.
The first are organized groups with explicitly specified structures and decision
procedures, like corporations and governments. The second are persistent but
unorganized social groups, e.g., races, genders, and nationalities. Finally, and
most controversially, there are random collectives (Held, 1970): groups of peo-
ple who are only connected by the relevance of some problem or task, e.g.,
passengers in train car 6745, or beachgoers in Asbury Park on July 23rd.
There is something puzzling about attributions of collective responsibility.
Generally, we only hold full moral agents—those capable of responding to moral
reasons—responsible for their actions. So, some philosophers have argued that
organized groups like Exxon-Mobil and the United States count as full moral
group agents: their organized decision-making systems make them reasons-
responsive. But this proposal is implausible as an explanation for attributions
of responsibility to random collectives that lack such collective decision-making
structures. Yet there are a variety of cases where it is intuitively plausible that
even fleeting, unorganized groups do bear collective responsibility. Many such
cases involve collective action problems, what Hindriks calls “collective harms”
(Hindriks, 2019). In this section, we will discuss desiderata for a theory explain-
ing the intuitive appeal of assigning collective responsibility in such cases.
There are two important distinctions to make when talking about respon-
sibility. First, there is a distinction between two senses of “responsibility”:
accountability and positive responsibility (Williams, 2008). The former sense
concerns when it is appropriate to hold someone accountable for something. The
antonym of this sense is “not responsible.” In contrast, the latter sense of “re-
sponsible” means a person has met their obligations. The antonym for this sense
is “irresponsible.” Epistemologists, especially responsibilists, have been inter-
ested in both kinds of responsibility (Baehr, 2011; Williams, 2008; Zagzebski,
1996). Here, we are primarily concerned with responsibility as accountability.
The second relevant distinction concerns backward-looking responsibility, as as-
sociated with praise and blame, and forward-looking responsibility, which is
associated with obligation and remediation (Smiley, 2017). Our view, like many
in the contemporary literature, will seek to apply coherently to both forward-
and backward-looking responsibility.
2.1 Desiderata for a theory of collective responsibility
Consider the following case:
Beach: A group of twelve children are swimming in the ocean. Three
of the children brought a parent with them. Suddenly, the wind
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changes and begins sweeping the children out to sea. Each adult
only has time to save one child by swimming. However, there is a
boat nearby that can be operated by two adults. With the boat, all
the children can be saved.4
Intuitively, the parents have an obligation to save all the children. However,
no individual adult can save all the children. Only the coordinated action of
two adults together can operate the boat. Hence, the children being swept
out to sea is a collective harm: it can only be prevented by collective action.
Moreover, the parents are not an organized group. The only connection between
them is that they happen to be at the beach at the relevant time. They are
thus a random collective. Despite each individual parent’s inability to save the
children, and despite their lack of organization as a group, it is still intuitive that
the parents are obligated to save all the children. This is an instance of what
we can call the primary intuition about collective responsibility for unorganized
groups (Björnsson, forthcoming; Schwenkenbecher, 2018).
A theory of collective moral responsibility must explain the primary intu-
ition. However, this isn’t the only requirement for such a theory. Schwenken-
becher suggests a variety of desiderata for an account of collective responsibility
(2018, pp. 111-112). For one thing, a theory needs to explain additional in-
tuitions, e.g., that each individual has responsibilities in such cases, and that
their (other) individual responsibilities can sometimes come into conflict with
the group responsibilities. In Beach, the individual parents each have an obli-
gation to save their own children, and this might conceivably conflict with the
group’s duty to save all the children. At the same time, each parent also seems
to have an individual duty to contribute to the collective action solution. Call
these the secondary intuitions.
In addition to explaining intuitions, a theory of collective responsibility
should also cohere with accepted principles of ascribing responsibility. There
are four conditions on responsibility which are commonly accepted principles of
this sort (Hindriks, 2019, p. 206, Schwenkenbecher, 2018):
1. The agency condition: Only full moral agents can bear responsibility.
A full moral agent is normatively competent in the sense of being receptive
and responsive to epistemic reasons (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998).
2. The causal condition: the agent is able to prevent the harm. This is a
type of ought-implies-can (OiC) principle.5
3. The epistemic condition: the agent has a justified belief about the ex-
istence of the pending harm and the likelihood of the success of preventing
it (potentially by means of a collective effort), or she is in an epistemic
position such that she is able to have a justified belief about this.
4. The no-defeaters condition: The agent does not have defeating evi-
dence that provides an excuse or a justification for not fulfilling the duty.
4This case is adapted from Björnsson (forthcoming). The original version of such cases is
from Held (1970). See also Parfit (1984).
5This does not require that the agent be able to prevent the harm “at will”. The ability to
do so reliably enough is adequate; what degree of reliability is required will vary with context.
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Explaining the primary intuition without violating these principles is difficult.
In particular, it is hard to explain the intuition in cases like Beach, as there are
no agents who satisfy both the agency and causal conditions. The unorganized
group is not an agent, while no individual parent can save all the children.
In addition, many philosophers have thought that a theory of collective re-
sponsibility for unorganized groups should be action-guiding, particularly in
that accepting the theory and following its dictates should lead to moral im-
provement. A theory vindicating the idea that groups are responsible should
enable us to argue that people are required to take part in collective action
solutions such as preventing climate change. To this end, a theory should not
only posit collective responsibility of groups, it should explain how individuals’
responsibilities are derived from (or related to) collective responsibility.
Finally, theories of collective responsibility should be evaluated in part based
on more generic explanatory virtues. A theory will thus be better insofar as it
is, more parsimonious, consilient, or has greater explanatory power.
2.2 The duty to join forces
There are two important choice points for a theory of collective responsibil-
ity. The first is reducibility. Reductive accounts explain away intuitions about
collective duties by reducing them to duties of individuals. Non-reductive ac-
counts suggest that collective responsibility is irreducibly ascribed to a collective
as such. The second choice point concerns how to deal with the agency con-
dition.6 Conservative theories attempt to accommodate the agency condition.
They seek to explain away the primary intuition by appeal to responsibilities of
either individual or group agents.7 Revisionist theorists, following Held (1970),
argue that being a full-fledged, reasons-responsive moral agent is not a require-
ment for bearing responsibility. Wringe (2016; 2019), for instance, takes the
primary intuition to be strong motivation, by itself, for discarding the agency
condition. Finally, joint (or shared) theories ascribe moral obligations and re-
sponsibilities only to individual agents. However, they suggest that the content
of those responsibilities is distinctively shared, as these call for irreducibly joint
actions.8
Each of these choices introduces problems for meeting the desiderata. Re-
duction requires denying the primary intuition, while anti-reduction requires
explaining who or what has the non-reducible responsibility. Conservatives of-
ten deny the primary intuition. Revisionists must deny the very plausible agency
condition. Joint/shared theorists postulate a mismatch between the individu-
als who bear the obligation and the entities obligated to carry it out, and so
they must motivate a variety of novel explanatory machinery to vindicate the
coherence of this idea.
6Here we follow the taxonomy of Schwenkenbecher (2019).
7See, e.g., Darby and Branscombe (2014), Feinberg (1968), List and Pettit (2011), McGary
(1986), Pettit and Schweikard (2006), and Tollefsen (2015).
8See, e.g., Björnsson (2014), Green (1991), Miller (2015b), Pinkert (2014), and Schwenken-
becher (2019).
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Hindriks (2019) proposes the Duty to Join Forces theory as a hybrid of the
above approaches, which avoids their pitfalls while keeping their strengths. The
central idea of his account is that collective responsibility is explained as a duty
in two stages: first, as a duty to join forces, and second, a duty to prevent the
harm. Hindriks starts from the idea that “a random collective has a duty to
prevent an outcome only if enough of its members are ready to suitably combine
their preventive efforts. Furthermore, such a collective often acquires this duty
only after a sufficient number of members have been mobilized.” (p. 205).
Thus, the view proposes two stages of responsibility that together comprise
the duty to join forces:
1. Mobilize others
2. Collectively prevent the harm.
The first stage of mobilizing others consists in a responsibility of individuals.
This is a responsibility of each member of the group to communicate with the
other group members and convince them to join the effort necessary for prevent-
ing the harm. In addition, individual group members have a responsibility to be
receptive to others who attempt to mobilize them. The first stage is successful
if an adequate number of group members have been suitably mobilized to join
the collective effort.
The second stage is a conditional norm: the duty only exists if the first stage
duty is fulfilled. If the stage I duty is satisfied, then the collective as a whole
has an obligation to prevent the harm. The mobilized collective now has a duty
to engage in the joint action needed to avert the bad consequences.9
We can illustrate the duty to join forces by appeal to Beach. First, the
parents have a responsibility to mobilize: to communicate and agree about
what they should do. In this case, each should communicate with the others
about the presence of the boat, and how they can work together to use the boat
for rescuing all the children. Once there is agreement among enough of them
about what course of action to take, and that they should take it, they have
successfully mobilized. This mobilization makes the group capable of operating
the boat and saving all the children. This activates the second stage: the
mobilized group of parents now has a responsibility to to save all the children.
At the time they have an obligation (forward-looking responsibility). If they fail
to do so they can be held accountable (backward responsibility) for this failure.
If both stages are completed successfully, then the parents will have fulfilled
their duty to join forces, i.e., their collective duty. Thus, the account explains
the primary intuition as applied to this case.
The status of a random collective after enough people have been successfully
mobilized to engage in collective action (other things being equal) is left largely
unexplored by Hindriks’ discussion. Hindriks highlights the difference in onto-
logical status between group agents and groups that have joined forces. This
9This norm is conditional in a narrow scope sense. If the stage I duty is satisfied, then the
obligation obtains, i.e., G is mobilized→ O(G prevents the harm). A wide scope reading of
ought here would make the view incoherent.
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much seems right to us, as we do not think such a group qualifies as a full moral
agent. As we discuss below, however, we think there is an important distinction
between the random collective before and after joining forces (Hindriks, 2019,
p. 211).
Hindriks’ account fares well regarding the desiderata introduced above (sec-
tion 2.1). It explains the primary intuition. It also explains the secondary
intuitions regarding individual duties: individuals have duties to mobilize oth-
ers, and then to engage in the joint action required to prevent the harm. It
coheres well with the previously accepted principles of ascribing responsibility,
with the notable exception of the agency condition (a caveat to be discussed in
§5). It is parsimonious in that the only novel things it proposes are the collec-
tive obligations which are needed to satisfy the primary intuition. It does not
require appeal to novel types of reasoning (Schwenkenbecher, 2019) , or com-
mitment to anything particular about moral motivation (Björnsson, 2014). The
claim that individuals have obligations to mobilize others makes no additional
ontological commitments, as individual responsibilities are commonly accepted
and necessary to vindicate the secondary intuition.
3 Collective epistemic responsibility
In this section, we propose a theory of collective epistemic responsibility de-
signed to explain the intuitions in our motivating cases, and to promote better
inquiry. Our theory is a hybrid account inspired by Hindriks’ Duty to Join
Forces. We propose it as a paradigmatic illustration of a theory of epistemic re-
sponsibility for collective epistemic harms. Even if the specific account we offer
is in some respects deficient, many of the points we make should be useful for the
construction of alternative accounts. At the very least, we hope to call atten-
tion to the importance of offering some account of preventionist responsibility
for collective epistemic harms.
We start from the idea, supported by our two motivating cases, that there
are certain epistemic harms that can be prevented only by a collective, rather
than by any of its members on their own. Let’s specify these notions:
Epistemic harm: a harm affecting the epistemic status of a subject, group of
subjects, or epistemically important social system.
This characterization intentionally leaves open the substance of epistemic
harm and is thereby compatible with different theories of epistemic value, justi-
fication, scientific progress, etc.10 For the purposes of illustrating an epistemic
harm, we can adopt a veritistic, reliabilist account (Goldman, 1979, 1986). On
such a view, a harm involves causing subjects to hold false beliefs, or undermin-
ing the reliability of their individual or social methods of belief formation.
10Our view is compatible with the leading theories about epistemic value, including truth,
knowledge (Williamson, 2002), understanding (Elgin, 2017; Kvanvig, 2003), problem solving
(Laudan, 1977), and answers to interesting questions (Millson and Khalifa, 2020).
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Generally, a harm is an event that leaves a person worse off with respect to
some value.11 What makes epistemic harms distinctly epistemic is that they are
harms with respect to the particular goals, values and standards of epistemic
normativity. That is, they are cases where one is worse-off from the perspective
of epistemic normativity. They are harmful in that they impede inquiry, impede
knowledge, undermine justification, lead to error, etc. They need not addition-
ally cause non-epistemic harms. For instance, according to veritism, doing well
epistemically is assessed in terms of maximizing true beliefs and minimizing false
ones. Epistemic harms then consist in being made worse-off in this respect. In
Biased, scientists are harmed epistemically due to biased research practices im-
peding their inquiry and leading them to false beliefs. Whether this happens in
fundamental research such as theoretical physics, or in the application-driven
one such as medicine, is beside the point. What matters is that scientists’ epis-
temic performance is worse-off.12 While epistemic harms may trigger moral
harms, they should not be conflated with them. Of course, epistemic harms of-
ten do lead to moral harms since being epistemically worse-off may affect other
aspects of one’s welfare, and in particular will make one prone to mistakes in
decision-making.
We are interested in a specific type of epistemic harm: the kind that can
only be prevented by group action. Thus:
Collective epistemic harm: an epistemic harm that can be prevented only
by a joint effort of several individual agents, rather than by any single
individual on their own.
The existence of such harms, as illustrated by our motivating cases from
section 1, shows the need for a theory of collective epistemic responsibility that
applies even to unorganized groups. Each of those cases elicits an intuitive judg-
ment analogous to the primary intuition in Beach. For instance, in Biased, a
collective epistemic harm results from the use of biased approaches that lead to
mistaken accounts of human past. The intuition is that the collective comprised
of scientists in this field is responsible for negligently following biased practices.
Call this the primary epistemic intuition. There is also a secondary intuition:
that individual researchers who are members of the collective bear their own,
individual responsibilities for failing to contribute to a joint solution to these
biased approaches. Moreover, there are other secondary intuitions. For one,
individual scientists may bear other responsibilities that may conflict with their
duty to help avoid collective harms, e.g., duties to support their graduate stu-
dents, the fulfillment of which would leave little time for work on community
issues.
11Here, we adopt a comparative account of harm, though our view is compatible with a
non-comparative account. For discussion of the large literature on harm, see Purves (2019)
and Rabenberg (2014).
12Our notion of epistemic harm is closely related to the notion of epistemic failing and
epistemic blame (Boult, 2021). Similarly, Goldberg (2016) appeals to epistemic harms of
lacking evidence. The epistemic injustice literature includes rich discussion of other types
of epistemic harms, see e.g., Barker et al. (2018), Dotson (2011), Fricker (2007), Kidd et al.
(2017), McKinnon (2016), and Medina (2013).
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The existence of collective epistemic harms, and the primary and secondary
epistemic intuitions, also leaves social epistemology with a problem similar to
that of collective moral responsibility in ethics. This is one upshot of our dis-
cussion worth highlighting, even for those who will disagree with our specific
account: there is a problem that requires a solution.
In view of this we propose a theory of collective epistemic responsibility
based on a two stage duty:
Epistemic duty to join forces: an obligation of an unorganized group to
prevent a collective epistemic harm. It consists of the following sub-duties:
D1: a duty of individuals to communicate with other agents about the
epistemic harm, express willingness to prevent it, and encourage oth-
ers to do the same;
D2: a duty of those who have fulfilled D1, and thereby formed a mobilized
group, to prevent the epistemic harm.
The epistemic duty to join forces (EDJF) is a two stage-view, like Hindriks’
account of collective moral responsibility. It is a conditional norm: D2 is trig-
gered when for a sufficient number of involved individuals D1 is successfully
fulfilled. The first stage is a responsibility of individual agents to mobilize oth-
ers. This requires communication and organization. If D1 is successful, then
the mobilized collective is responsible for preventing the harmful outcome, first
in prospective sense, meaning there is a collective epistemic duty to follow the
norm, and subsequently in the retrospective sense, meaning the group is epis-
temically praise- or blame-worthy.
Note that if the members of a random collective fail to fulfill D1, then D2 is
not triggered. In this case, individual members of the group will be blameworthy
for failing to join forces (for failing D1). But since the collective has never been
adequately mobilized, the collective is never capable of preventing the harm,
and so never obtains a duty to prevent the harm. Thus, according to EDJF,
duties to prevent collective harms remain conditional: the collective duty only
obtains once the individual duties to join forces have been fulfilled. This has
the benefit of ascribing duties in such cases (i.e., cases where D1 duties are
unmet) only to agents who fulfill the conditions of all four standard principles
of responsibility. Only at the second stage is responsibility born by the collective.
If the collective is never suitably mobilized to prevent the harm—i.e., there is
no joining of forces—then D2 simply never obtains. Nonetheless, EDJF does
predict that members of the collective bear epistemic responsibility in such a
case, and will thereby be epistemically blameworthy as individuals for failing to
fulfill D1 (unless they have some excuse). Moreover, the view suggests a sense
in which the unorganized collective is responsible: all of its members have a
duty to join forces. This helps to vindicate the primary intuition. D1 is thus
a reducible group responsibility. The sense in which the group is responsible is
reducible to the fact that its members are.13
13Lackey (2016) offers a view of justified group belief with interesting similarities, in that
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A group which has successfully joined forces, and met its D1 duty, must be
importantly different in its structure and capabilities than it was prior to mobi-
lization. This new structure will generally fall short of what is required for group
agency. However, a group that has successfully communicated, agreed to join
forces, and agreed to a plan, will be importantly different in its abilities than it
was prior to joining forces. This is what makes it reasonable to ascribe D2 to
a mobilized group: the group satisfies the causal condition for D2, whereas the
random collective did not. Coordinating on a plan of action increases the groups
capabilities. We propose that groups which have completed their stage one duty
to join forces be called mobilized groups. Such groups have distinct membership,
greater organization, and greater capabilities than a random collective. How-
ever, they need not incorporate into a full-fledged, reasons-responsive group
agent.14 For instance, if two of the three parents in Beach succeed in joining
forces and agree to use the boat, they become a mobilized group. So mobi-
lized, they are able to use the boat, and thereby satisfy the causal condition
of the second stage duty to save the children. Similarly, after other archaeolo-
gists in Biased raised awareness about androcentric assumptions and the lack of
research into microscale practices and past cultural situations in which women
were likely to have been present (Conkey, 2003), they formed a mobilized group,
capable of combating gender bias in archaeology by endorsing the above aspects
of research, emphasizing them as relevant through peer-review, etc.
EDJF and its associated benefits can be illustrated by appeal to Abandoned-
research. In that case, a plausible and (it turned out) true theory,15 the bacterial
hypothesis, was dropped from active research. The question is who is account-
able for this premature abandonment? The case thus concerns retrospective
responsibility. EDJF analyzes this case using its two stages. In particular, D1
is active as a requirement for the group. Assuming that the epistemic and the
no-defeaters conditions were satisfied (which is a historical matter), the medical
community had a duty to join forces in order to prevent the epistemic harm
that resulted from abandoning the bacterial hypothesis. The individual mem-
bers of the community had a duty to communicate about avoiding the harm
ahead of time. This could have been accomplished by an agreement to fund
new research specifically on the bacterial theory. Or it could involve a research
fund to ensure that pursuitworthy theories are rescued more generally. Either
option would require communication and agreement on some reformulation of
the organization of the medical research community. Since researchers in the
community failed to engage in this communication, or make any attempt to get
others to join forces, the community has failed to fulfill D1. It is retrospectively
responsible for this failure.
it also seeks a middle ground between reductionism and no-reductionism. For Lackey, this
means requiring some individual beliefs while also requiring collective acceptance.
14This distinguishes EDJF from an epistemic version of Collins’ “duty to incorporate”
(2013).
15Note that even if the bacterial hypothesis had been false, EDJF would still apply: aban-
doning pursuitworthy theories risks epistemic harm (for discussions of such situations see
Fleisher, 2018; Šešelja et al., 2012; Šešelja and Straßer, 2014a).
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Now, consider a variant of the case:
Abandoning : Here we imagine a case like Abandoned-research, ex-
cept we consider the situation in the early twentieth century just
before the bacterial hypothesis was abandoned. Suppose that it was
apparent that this abandonment would occur soon, as all recent pub-
lications, PhD work, and grants had gone to proponents of the acid
theory.
In Abandoning, EDJF suggests that there is a prospective responsibility of
type D1: the research community is obligated to communicate about how to
save the bacterial hypothesis. Each member is responsible for attempting to
convince others that the theory should be rescued, and they must be receptive
to similar entreaties. If the community in Abandoning does fulfill its obligation
to join forces, it thereby obtains a D2 obligation: to prevent the abandonment
of the theory.
Consider two more variations of the case:
Rescued : This case is just like Abandoning, but now we imagine
the community has in fact succeeded at joining forces. There is
widespread communication and agreement that the bacterial hy-
pothesis must be saved. The community agrees to create new grants
to fund research into the bacterial hypothesis.
Failed rescue: This case also proceeds just like Abandoning, and here
the community also succeeds at joining forces, achieving widespread
agreement that the bacterial theory must be saved. However, after
this agreement is reached, the community spends too long deliberat-
ing about how to organize and award the new grant-funding scheme.
Research is stalled, and the theory is effectively abandoned anyway.
In Rescued, EDJF is completely fulfilled. The community successfully fulfills
its D1 obligation to join forces and mobilizes, thereby obtaining a D2 obligation
to prevent the collective epistemic harm of abandoning the bacterial theory.
The D2 obligation is fulfilled when some members of the community agree to
pursue the theory. This illustrates successful fulfillment of prospective responsi-
bility. Moreover, this version of the community subsequently is responsible for
preventing the harm, and is thereby praiseworthy.
Failed rescue, however, illustrates a community which fulfills D1, but still
fails to meet its collective obligation. In this case, the EDJF suggests that
the community has failed a collective duty. The mobilized group is collectively
responsible for failing to prevent the harm. It is culpable, qua group, for this
failure.
These variant cases show the flexibility and nuance offered by EDJF. The
theory distinguishes normatively relevant differences between circumstances.
The group in Failed rescue does seem to have done better than the one in
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the original version of Abandoned-research: it has at least recognized the prob-
lem and joined collective forces with the aim of solving it. It just fails this final
step. At the same time, the Failed rescue group has a duty that the original
group lacks. This makes sense, since their mobilization gives them the capabil-
ity to prevent the harm which original group lacks. A disorganized collective
is not able to solve such a problem, while a mobilized collective is. EDJF pre-
scribes duties only to groups capable of fulfilling them, as required by the causal
condition.
4 Justifying EDJF
Our first goal in this paper was to raise awareness of the issues surrounding
collective epistemic harms, as illustrated by our motivating cases. A second
goal was to give an example of a theory which addresses the responsibilities and
obligations that arise from such harms. Even if one doubts that EDJF is correct,
we hope they are convinced that responsibility for collective epistemic harms
should be addressed by an adequate theory of epistemic responsibility. In this
section, however, we argue more specifically for the benefits of EDJF, based on
the way it meets the desiderata discussed above (§2.1) before defending it from
potential objections (§5).
First, let’s consider the primary intuition as it applies to Biased. Here, the
primary intuition is that the random collective comprised of archaeologists has
a collective responsibility to eliminate the gender bias in their domain. One
interpretation of the primary intuition here is that each scientist has a duty to
eliminate the biases in the field. However, since the scientists form a random
collective, and since no individual one of them controls the others, no individual
was plausibly capable of eliminating these biases alone. Hence, this individual-
responsibility interpretation of the primary intuition conflicts with the causal
condition and the “Ought implies Can” principle. Another interpretation of
the primary intuition is that scientists as a group have a duty to eliminate the
biases. However, this interpretation also conflicts with OiC. The scientists are
not organized, so there is no group with the proper structure and causal powers
to be held responsible. Without organization, the group is incapable of fixing
the bias problem. Thus, there is no entity in this case that satisfies the causal
condition for eliminating the gender bias.
We suggest that a precise way to explicate the primary intuition in cases
like Biased, without violating the causal condition or OiC, is as follows: each
scientist has a duty to mobilize other scientists in order to reform the field and
eliminate bias, and once mobilized the given scientists have a duty to engage in
that reform. EDJF explains the primary intuition explicated this way: D1 as-
signs a duty to individual scientists to mobilize in order to reform their practice,
while D2 assigns a duty to the mobilized collective to actually implement those
reforms. This explanation vindicates the primary intuition, while ensuring its
compatibility with the causal condition and OiC principles more generally.
Next, we consider secondary intuitions. We noted above two important
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secondary intuitions for a theory to address. First, that individuals also have
responsibilities to contribute to preventing collective harms. Second, that other
individual responsibilities can come into conflict with the group responsibilities.
The epistemic duty to join forces offers explanations for both of these secondary
intuitions. According to EDJF, individuals have D1 responsibilities to commu-
nicate with others, attempt to enlist them in a coordinated effort, and to be
receptive to others attempts to do the same. These are individual responsibili-
ties to contribute to the collective action solution. At the same time, individuals
may have other obligations. For instance, in Abandoned-research, a researcher
may have had a responsibility to continue work on the excess acid theory given
the funding they received, or because their lab was better positioned to test
that hypothesis. This is a conflicting responsibility, because it at least suggests
that the researcher should continue such work at the expense of spending time
enlisting others to save the bacterial hypothesis. Which obligation is the more
important for an individual to follow will depend on the details of their situa-
tion. But any plausible theory will need to allow for such a conflict, and EDJF
does so.
We now turn to the harmony of EDJF with existing principles of respon-
sibility (from §2.1: the agency, causal, epistemic, and no-defeaters conditions.
The no-defeaters condition requires no modification or special consideration as
applied to collective epistemic responsibility. The causal condition states that
an agent bears a responsibility to prevent a harm only if they are able to do
so. As we have seen, compatibility with the causal condition is one of the main
motivations for two-stage accounts like EDJF. In EDJF’s analysis of Abandoned-
research, the causal condition was fulfilled for D1, since each individual scientist
is plausibly able to communicate about joining forces. In rescued, the condition
is also fulfilled for D2, since after joining forces the mobilized group is capable of
preventing the abandonment of theory by, e.g., agreeing to create new funding
for researching the theory.
The epistemic condition requires that an agent must have a justified belief
about the existence (or risk) of pending harm. Moreover, they must have a justi-
fied belief about some reasonably probable way of preventing it. EDJF respects
this condition at both stages: at D1, each individual must be in a position to
have such beliefs; at D2, every member of the mobilized group must be in a
position to have them. One might wonder whether there is potential circularity
in applying an epistemic condition to an account of epistemic responsibility.
The worry is that epistemic responsibility is required for justified belief, while
justified belief is required for epistemic responsibility. However, this worry can
be assuaged by two points: first, as we noted above (§1) the preventionist, ac-
countability sort of responsibility EDJF represents is distinct from traditional
accounts of positive epistemic responsibility for belief. Satisfying EDJF is not
required for justified belief-formation. Second, even if satisfying EDJF were
required for some justified belief, this is not unusual. Responsibly believing one
proposition often involves a prior requirement of responsibly believing another.
Any problems this causes are in no way specific to our account: they are a form
of the traditional regress of justification (Hasan and Fumerton, 2016) to which
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many solutions have been offered.
The situation with the agency condition is more complicated. The agency
condition requires that only full moral agents—agents who are normatively com-
petent and reasons-responsive—can be the bearers of responsibilities and obli-
gations. This principle has traditionally been the sticking point for theories of
collective moral responsibility. It is plausible that organized groups, like corpo-
rations, have the requisite decision-making structure and sensitivity to reasons
required for counting as full moral agents. However, ex hypothesi random col-
lectives do not constitute group agents.
Advocates of the idea that random collectives can be morally responsible
for preventing collective harms have argued that the agency condition is false,
at least as it is traditionally understood (e.g., Wringe, 2019). Hindriks (2019)
argues that the agency condition is too restrictive. It was intended to rule out
holding animals, small children, and other non-competent agents as responsible.
It was never meant to apply to the collective cases. He opts for a revised
version which allows that either full moral agents or groups made up of such can
bear responsibility. Analogously, we suggest that this kind of modified agency
condition should apply also to epistemic responsibility: that either normatively
competent (reasons-responsive) agents or groups made up of such may bear
epistemic responsibility.16
In addition to its explanation of the intuitions and its coherence with the four
principles, we may also evaluate EDJF based on more general theoretical virtues
such as parsimony. While EDJF does require two kinds of duties to explain the
relevant cases, the theory only requires types of responsibilities that we already
have independent reason to accept. D1 duties are simply ordinary obligations
of individuals, and are not particularly exotic. D2 obligations are similar to
those suggested independently for organized groups such as corporations and
research labs. As we have noted, D2 is also similar to views about collective
responsibility of persistent social groups. Given EDJF’s explanatory power in
a range of cases, as illustrated above, any loss of parsimony seems minimal.
Finally, we also think that EDJF has the potential to provide helpful action
guidance, and that following this guidance will lead to epistemic improvement.
A community where individuals followed EDJF, and held others responsible in
the way it prescribes, could potentially avoid epistemic harms, and may thus
have better epistemic outcomes. This last claim depends on further empirical
claims which we are not in a position to defend here. But this idea points
to fruitful lines of future research. This research could employ agent-based
modeling, case-studies, or behavioral experiments to inquire into whether groups
that follow EDJF are better at learning more and better at avoiding epistemic
harms.
The epistemic duty to join forces thus does well when evaluated according to
16We think that the original restricted agency condition is even less plausible in the epistemic
case. There is a long history of appeal to epistemic evaluation of entities other than individ-
ual agents, including both groups (Fagan, 2012; Gilbert, 2000; Miller, 2015a; Rolin, 2008;
Tollefsen, 2004; Wray, 2007) and social systems (Goldman, 1999; Longino, 1990; Solomon,
2001).
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the main desiderata of a theory of collective responsibility. The only potential
issue regarding these desiderata is the agency condition, and there is reason to
doubt that condition in its original form.
5 Potential objections and replies
One might wonder whether EDJF is the best available theory. Instead of ap-
pealing to the duty to join forces, one could instead build a theory of collective
epistemic responsibility by modifying a different account of collective moral
responsibility—such as those proposed by Björnsson (2014) and Schwenken-
becher (2018). Indeed, if proponents of joint views did build epistemic versions
of them, this would fulfill the first goal we established for this paper: recogni-
tion of collective epistemic harms and the importance building a preventionist
theory of responsibility to account for them.
However, we prefer EDJF to joint responsibility views. One reason for this
preference is that we worry joint views involve an apparent mismatch between
the kinds of agents who bear obligations (individuals), and the kinds of agents
capable of fulfilling the obligations (the groups). For joint views, the agent
that has the capability is not the same as the agent who bears the obligation.
This commitment seems at least prima facie in tension with ought-implies-can
principles and the causal condition on assigning responsibility. This is one of the
primary motivations of the two-stage approach pioneered by Hindriks. While
we don’t take this to be a knock-down objection to joint views, we do think it
is a reason to prefer the duty to join forces.
Another potential worry for the duty to join forces view, both the epistemic
and moral versions, concerns the status of the mobilized group. One might worry
that once a group has mobilized (i.e., the group has communicated, agreed on
a plan, and agreed to carry out the plan), it will count as a full-fledged moral
agent. Why not think that is what is going on in all these cases: the duty to
join forces just is a duty to incorporate into a full-fledged group moral agent? In
fact, Collins (2013) proposes a rival account of collective responsibility in terms
of just such a duty to incorporate into a group agent.
However, Collins admits that in cases like Beach it is implausible that the
random collective must incorporate into a full-fledged moral agent (like a gov-
ernment or corporation) in order to save the children. This seems correct, as
the parents need not develop any long-term, established procedures for decision-
making. This is unnecessary: all they need is to quickly agree on a single plan
of action. Moreover, we suspect that any theory of group moral agency would
be too permissive if it counts making a single plan of action as constituting
incorporation into a full moral agent.17 Thus, even if there is sometimes a duty
to incorporate, this duty does not explain all the cases we are interested in. In
particular, we don’t think it accounts well for Abandoned-research and Biased.
17Even List and Pettit’s highly permissive view of what it takes for group agency does not
have this consequence, as they note explicitly regarding Held’s beach case (2011, p. 34).
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Hence, ascribing responsibility as prescribed by EDJF will do a better job of
preventing collective epistemic harms in a variety of cases.
A second potential worry takes the opposite track, suggesting there is no need
to posit any form of collective responsibility in cases like Beach and Abandoned-
research. Instead, these can be understood as cases where individuals have
duties to use other people as means to fulfilling their goals (Collins, 2013). On
this account, in Beach, each parent has a duty to use the help of the other
parents, in the same way they have the duty to use boat. So parent A has a
duty with content: use the parent B and the boat to save the children. However,
we think this suggested alternative suffers from a similar worry to the one we
suggested above for shared responsibility accounts: it posits a mismatch between
the agent who bears the obligation and the agent capable of carrying out the
duty. Parent A doesn’t have the capability, on her own, to ensure an action
is taken that satisfies the duty. This picture thereby fails to cohere with the
causal condition for assigning responsibility. While this is again not a knock-
down objection to such a view, we do think avoiding this worry is an advantage
of the duty to join forces.
A different objection concerns whether EDJF involves genuinely epistemic
duties. One might wonder: Why do we need a separate notion of collective
epistemic responsibility to go along with the more general moral notion?
EDJF fits into a general shift in epistemology that takes epistemic norma-
tivity to involve more than evaluating or constraining how a subject responds
to their evidence. This strand of research developed as an alternative to the
traditional, evidentialist view of epistemic norms (Feldman, 2002, Conee and
Feldman, 2004, Shah, 2006; Shah and Velleman, 2005). According to eviden-
tialism, norms are epistemic only if they concern how to respond to evidence
with an appropriate belief state . The main problem with evidentialism is
that it excludes from the purview of epistemic evaluation the greater portion
of our epistemic pursuits, including the activities of inquiry. In contrast, the
literature on epistemic responsibility has long sought to broaden the notion of
epistemic normativity to include norms, standards, and virtues concerning the
acquisition of adequate evidence prior to belief formation (Kornblith, 1983b,
Miller and Record, 2013, Robitzsch, 2019).18 Subsequent literature has sought
to expand the notion of epistemic normativity to include norms governing other
aspects of inquiry (Fleisher, 2018; Friedman, 2020; Goldberg, 2018; Šešelja and
Straßer, 2013). Our account aims to contribute further to this broadening of
the conception of epistemic normativity. EDJF extends the notion of epistemic
responsibility to actions other than those directly involved with the formation
of beliefs.
Ultimately, however, if one is keen to reserve the term “epistemic responsi-
bility” for a narrow set of belief-forming norms, our account should nonetheless
be distinguished from theories of moral responsibility. Whether one wishes to
devise a new term for it—such as ‘zetetic responsibility’, on the model offered
by (Friedman, 2020)— is a terminological issue. The key point here is that if
18For additional discussion see Robitzsch (2019).
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one cares about the epistemic aims of inquiry, they should care about this sort
of responsibility as well. Responsibility for preventing epistemic harms should
be considered an important aspect of the internal norms and standards of the
activity of inquiry.19 This is why we think the term “epistemic” is appropriate,
but the term itself is unimportant. What matters is that this is a distinctive
kind of normativity associated with inquiry, and should be distinguished from
other kinds of norms.
Another potential objection is that EDJF involves an inappropriate imposi-
tion on scientists research choices. For one thing, EDJF’s duties might seem to
conflict with academic freedom. However, we note that EDJF is a theory about
what epistemic duties individuals and groups have, while academic freedom con-
cerns what legal or institutional enforcement mechanisms are permissible. It is
compatible with EDJF being an accurate account of epistemic responsibility
that legal or institutional enforcement of EDJF is impermissible. Academic
freedom protects scientists from institutional sanction based on what they be-
lieve or research. But this is compatible with their having epistemic duties not
to believe a theory based on inadequate evidence.
Alternatively, one might worry that EDJF will lead to a loss of efficiency
in inquiry. That is, a scientific community that follows EDJF will be ordering
scientists to work on specific theories via a kind of “central planning”, rather
than allowing scientists to compete in a scientific marketplace. And we might
worry that such central planning will perform poorly compared to allowing
individual scientists to follow their own judgment. However, EDJF does not
require this kind of planning. As we tried to emphasize in discussing variants of
Abandoned-research, a collective solution may be implemented using the kinds
of systems already in place for guiding research: grant-funding schemes. Such
a scheme uses market mechanisms to guide the direction of research, without
ordering individual scientists to do anything.
6 Outlook and conclusion
One of our primary goals in this paper was to highlight the existence of collec-
tively preventable epistemic harms. Abandoned-research and Biased exemplify
an important class of cases which have not been adequately recognized by social
epistemologists. We argued that these cases call out for an account of collec-
tive epistemic responsibility for preventing such harms. We then offered an
account of collective epistemic responsibility, the epistemic duty to join forces,
which explained how to make sense of this kind of responsibility. This collective,
preventionist account complements existing theories of epistemic responsibility.
We conclude the paper by highlighting the significance of our account for dis-
cussions on both collective epistemic and collective moral harms. First, the suc-
cess of EDJF provides support for the fruitfulness of the moral duty to join forces
as a theory of collective responsibility. Furthermore, EDJF offers a successful
19This point is inspired by Maguire and Woods’ account of traditional epistemic reasons
which appeals to the internal standards of the activity of belief-formation (2020).
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account of epistemic responsibility that also appeals to a weakened agency con-
dition, which offers additional justification for weakening that condition. Our
notion of a mobilized group also helpfully supplements the moral DJF theory by
explaining how it satisfies the causal condition. EDJF also suggests future lines
of fruitful research regarding the effects of mobilizing to prevent future harms,
and on the best means for doing so.
Finally, our account can be useful in the analysis of some additional cases,
including those outside of scientific inquiry. For instance, EDJF offers a helpful
supplement to theories of epistemic injustice20 since many cases of epistemic
injustice will count as collective epistemic harms. Similarly, our account can help
in addressing epistemic duties arising from the threat of “fake news” typical for
epistemically pernicious groups, such as epistemic bubbles and echo chambers
(Boyd, 2019).
Other scientific cases to which EDJF may apply are examples of radically
collaborative research involving large groups of scientists. This kind of research
is epistemically distributed, and involves groups that are decentralized and in-
terdisciplinary (Kukla, 2012; Winsberg et al., 2014). Collective epistemic harms
can easily occur in such contexts.
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